Though everyone has some idea on how to define madness, yours is as good as another. What I am stressing, however, is to get beyond these normative definitions of madness as a kind of psychopathology. Today, I would propose madness is secondary, at the limit the whole world is mad by the standard psychopathological definitions. Rather what is more important to define is the problem of a psychosis that is not madness, irrational, dysfunctional, but part of the norm and hyper-functional. That is why I said in my first response there is already a kind of hallucination already at work in linguistics, it is not irrational, dysfunctional, etc., but an ideational element encountered by any science. It is the banal, but remarkable aspect of psychosis as machine and Freudian psychic reality that is crucial to isolate and differentiate from madness in a first step. In a second step, it will be important to determine how a psychosis can, indeed, become mad, though it is not necessary.

Not sure if such a short response is clear, but thanks for giving the article a read and your response in public.